


The Slowdown in GDP Growth: Decomposition and Some Implications

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Social Security TPAM
January 16, 2015


Is the Growth Slowdown New – I

Real GDP (log) and NBER peak-to-peak trend




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
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
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
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


Is the Growth Slowdown New – I

Figure 1-2

Real Gross Domestic Product and Trends, 1960–2012

Trillions of chained 2005 dollars, log scale




Note: Shading denotes recession. Trend lines represent the average growth rate between successive business-cycle peaks.

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts; National Bureau of Economic Research; CEA calculations.

Source: *Economic Report of the President* (2013)

Is the Growth Slowdown New – II

Real GDP: 4Q growth rates and trends



Trend GDP growth

1965	3.8%
1975	3.5%
1985	3.1%
1995	3.0%
2005	2.5%
2010	2.1%

— d4lr GDP
— rgdp: MA(40) trend
— rgdp: cycl. adj. trend

Methods, Part I: Supply-Side Decomposition

Selected references on aspects of the GDP slowdown

Aaronson, S. et. al., *BPEA* (2006) (on LFPR)

Aaronson, S. et. al., *BPEA* (2014) (on LFPR)

Aaronson, D. et. al., Chicago Fed *EP* (2014) (on LFPR)

CBO, *Economic Outlook – Update* (August 2014)

CEA, *Economics Report of the President*, Ch. 2 (2013)

Gordon, *NBER WP 20423* (2014)

Hall, *NBER Macro Annual* (2014)

Stock and Watson, *BPEA* (2012)

Supply side decomposition:

$$GDP_t = \frac{GDP_t}{Hours_t} \times \frac{Hours_t}{Worker_t} \times \frac{Workers_t}{LaborForce_t} \times \frac{LF_t}{Population_t} \times Population$$


In growth rates:

$$\Delta \ln GDP_t = \Delta \ln Productivity_t + \Delta \ln WklyHrs_t + \Delta \ln EmpRate_t + \Delta \ln LFPR_t + \Delta \ln Pop_t$$

Note: *EmpRate* = the employment rate = 1 – unemployment rate, which is almost entirely cyclical – so ignore for this long-run analysis (makes negligible contribution)

Methods, Part II: The End-Point Problem of Trend Estimation

Total LFPR and 1970-2007 time series trend



Methods, Part II (ctd.): Estimating Cyclically-Adjusted Trend

Partially linear regression model

Robinson (*Econometrica* 1988), Stock (JASA 1989)

Recent theory: Cai [*J. Econometrics* 2007], Zhang and Wu (A.S. 2012)

Recent empirical: CEA (2014):


$$LFPR_t = \mu_t + \beta(L)u_t^{gap} + v_t$$

Estimation

- Options for trend:
 - Global polynomial
 - Local polynomial (local linear trend)
 - Kernel smoother (the choice here)
- 2-step kernel estimation of $\beta(L)$:
 - i. Deviate LFPR, u-gap from low-frequency trend (biweight kernel, BW = 40)
 - ii. Regress deviated LFPR on deviated u-gap ($t+2, t+1, \dots, t-8$)
- Estimate on 1959q1-2007q4 $LFPR_t = \hat{\beta}(L)u_t^{gap}$ so cyclical coeffs estimated through 2007q4
- Cyclically adjust LFPR:
- Smooth the cyclically-adjusted LFPR (biweight kernel)
- Standard errors on cyclical part require adjustment for nonparametric step
- Have done many robust checks, alternative estimators, etc.


$$\Delta \ln GDP_t = \Delta \ln Productivity_t + \Delta \ln WklyHrs_t + \Delta \ln EmpRate_t + \Delta \ln LFPR_t + \Delta \ln Pop_t$$

Real GDP: 4Q growth rates and trends





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Economy-wide productivity: 4Q growth rates and trends



Productivity Slowdown?

- 4-Q % growth and cyclical component
- Economy-wide v. NFB
- The past ~3 years have seen very slow productivity growth
- This is true even after cyclical adjustment
- It is true both for NFB and economy-wide productivity growth
- However, productivity series have a great deal of noise and it is too early to make a firm judgment



Productivity Slowdown?


Agricultural Productivity

- Labor productivity growth (7r MA)
- TFP growth (7r MA)
- Labor productivity growth, 1868-2011 (3.2%)

In agriculture:

- Outputs and inputs are relatively well-measured
- Little evidence of a labor productivity slowdown
- Or of a TFP slowdown
- In fact, ag. labor productivity growth 1975-present fluctuates around its post-1868 average


1868 3.2% compounded growth:
Iowa corn, Parker and Klein (1966),
1870 Census of Mfgs, BLS, USDA;
CEA ERP (2014)



Productivity Slowdown?

- Nonfarm business labor productivity growth (7r MA)
- Nonfarm business MFP growth (7r MA)


Growth of NFB labor productivity (green)
and TFP (orange), 7-yr MA



Productivity Slowdown?


- 4-quarter nonfarm business labor productivity growth
- Trends: 7-year backwards MA and cyclically-adjusted

NFB labor productivity: 4-quarter growth,
7-yr MA, and cyclically-adjusted trend




$$\Delta \ln GDP_t = \Delta \ln Productivity_t + \Delta \ln WklyHrs_t + \Delta \ln EmpRate_t + \Delta \ln LFPR_t + \Delta \ln Pop_t$$

Hours per employee (HH): 4Q growth rates and trends




Weekly Hours

Average Weekly Hours




Weekly Hours of Men and Women




- Overall weekly hours fell during the 1970s, have fallen less since then
- Shift-share decomposition suggests that the decline in hours is largely compositional
- Women work part-time more than men – both shares are fairly stable – and entered the workforce strongly in the 1970s, with a plateau around 2000

Weekly Hours

Weekly Hours for Full-Time and Part-Time Workers




Weekly Hours, Services and Goods-Producing Industries



- Full-time and part-time hours have remained remarkably steady
- There has also been a shift from goods-producing industries (with hours around 40) to services (with lower hours, around 32.5 since the mid-80s).

$$\Delta \ln GDP_t = \Delta \ln Productivity_t + \Delta \ln WklyHrs_t + \Delta \ln EmpRate_t + \Delta \ln LFPR_t + \Delta \ln Pop_t$$

LFPR: 4Q growth rates and trends




— d4lfpr
 — lfpr: cycl. adj. trend

— lfpr: MA(40) trend


LFPR for men ages 25-54 (levels)

- For men, the downward decline in the LFPR has been ongoing for decades – that isn't an aging effect
- Cyclical LFPR movements for men 25-54 are quite small
- The decline for women now matches the decline for men
- A key question is whether this preexisting non-aging trend decline will continue, on top of the aging effect?




LFPR since 2007q4 (levels)

- Currently, the dominant trend is the retirement of the Baby Boom
- The pure aging effect can be calculated by holding the 2007 age profile constant and letting the population age (i.e. retire at historically normal rates)
- The pure aging trend and the time series trends are virtually identical





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
Population: 4Q growth rates and trends



$$\Delta \ln GDP_t = \Delta \ln Productivity_t + \Delta \ln WklyHrs_t + \Delta \ln EmpRate_t + \Delta \ln LFPR_t + \Delta \ln Pop_t$$

Supply-side decomposition of trend GDP growth






- Since 1985, the 10-year Treasury rate has followed the decline in real GDP growth
- Both series are noisy and cyclical...

r-g

r-g: Ex-post real 10-yr Treasury Rate minus CA trend GDP growth



- During the late 60's and 70's, inflation forecasts were too low
- During the late 80's and 90's, inflation forecasts were too high
- During 2000-2007, inflation forecasts were right on average and r-g averaged ~0
- This points to r-g close to zero; the post-1960 average is 0.06
- A decline in g of 0.9pp since 1995 corresponds to a comparable decline in r